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On the Measurement of the Physical Output
of Public Utilities
Physical output might at first sight be considered a fairly simple
notion; nevertheless it is a notion capable of a numberdifferent
interpretations, some of which must be distinguished briefly. Take
for example the contrast between gross and net output. Not only
is there some doubt as to just what deductions separate gross output
from net, but in addition common usage employs the terms differ-
ently in relation to a single enterprise and to the economy as a
whole.
CONCEPTS
Naturally for a single enterprise gross output comprises the
entire product, without any deductions whatever. In such a case
the entire output of the firm is treated as originating within the
enterprise, irrespective of any input which the firm may obtain
from elsewhere. Net output on the other hand is what remains
alter appropriate deductions are made. The comprehensiveness of
these deductions varies with the purpose in hand. Thus we may
subtract materials and fuel purchased elsewhere, and even the
firm's consumption of its own capital. The intention is always tO
segregate the portion of its gross output that in some sense origi-
nates within the firm in question: the remainder —thefirm's
input —originatesin other enterprises. In its strictest sense, there-
fore, net. output includes only the contribution of the factors —
naturalresources, labor, and capital —peculiarto the enterprise
in question. Conceptually it is identical with the real income origi-
nating within the enterprise. In this strict sense input, regarded as
the difference between gross and net output, comprises not merely
a firm's purchased materials, but everything necessary to maintain
its capital intact. Conceptual and statistical difficulties connected
with the maintenance of capital may lead us to prefer a rather less
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strict, i.e., less comprehensive, definition of input, and an associ-
ated definition of net output in which only some of the appropriate
deductions from gross output are made. Indeed the actual business
of performing deductions of this kind is difficult enough, for in
order to conform with our concepts it has to be performed in real
rather than in money terms. But a discussion of concepts must
precede any discussion of the measurement of their contents.
So much for the output of the individual enterprise. The physi-
cal output of the community as a whole also may be considered
in either aspect, gross or net. The gross output of the community,
not further qualified in common usage, remains a rather vague
notion. It may mean simply the sum of the gross outputs of all the
enterprises in the system. In that case it includes an amount of
duplication which depends upon the business structure of the econ-
omy considered. Usually, however, gross output for the community
means something narrower and less arbitrary than this. It means
the sum of the net outputs of the various enterprises, the word 'net'
being interpreted for this purpose before allowance for the con-
sumption of capital and natural resources. The aggregate may be
called the community's output 'gross of depreciation and deple-
tion'. Unlike the preceding concept, it is independent of the busi-
ness structure of the economy.
The net output of the community is plainly the sum of the net
outputs of enterprises, 'net' being comprehensively interpreted to
include deductions for depreciation of capital and depletion of
natural resources. This is the concept that corresponds to our
notions of 'real national income' or 'national dividend'. Again,
since the appropriate deductions may be made with a greater or
less degree of thoroughness, the aggregate so obtained may contain
much or little duplication.
What purpose do such measures of output serve? In the long
run, as a check upon deflated national income statistics they have
perhaps some value. As a short run measure of real income, or of
economic activity, such indexes as those compiled by the Federal
Reserve Board in this country or the Board of Trade in Britain
have obvious usefulness. But for the purpose of making. compari-
sons over long periods of time, there is perhaps some risk of claim-THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 165
ing more for indexes of output than they can actually perform. For
example, unless we make a whole of further assumptions,
none of which is easy to justify, an index of output (regarded as
the equivalent of a measure of real income) in fact tells us little
about variations, either in the amount of resources engaged in
production, or in the real satisfactions obtained from consumption.
Fortunately we have other, more direct ways of measuring the
employment of resources. Some may claim that indexes of physical
output have a more direct bearing upon the question of consumer
satisfaction. Even here, however, it may be. argued that the supply
of certain socially significant sample commodities, e.g., the number
of bathtubs per head, tells us more about consumer satisfaction
than do composite measures of output or real income. Nevertheless,
it remains tempting to assume that net output and the level of
consumer satisfaction do, in general, move in the same direction,
even if we can know nothing about the quantitative relationship
between them.' However this ma;' be, the primary purpose of
constructing indexes of output remaithe less ambitious one of
keeping tab on the over-all efficienc) of the economy, or of seg-
ments of it: regarding this efficiencya technological rather than
as a psychological concept.
UNITS
Suppose that the entire output of an economic system comprised
a single uniform product, let us say oranges of a certain specified
size, weight, color, juiciness, and so forth. In these peculiar condi-
tions, to measure the physical output of the economy would be
simple. By merely counting the number of oranges harvested from
year to year, or weighing them, or measuring their juice content,
an index of output would at once be available free both from am-
biguity and fràm arbitrariness. Nor would it matter in the least
which measure was chdsen, for as long as output remained homoge-
neous each would yield the same result, i.e., disclose the same pat-
tern of temporal variation. Only in this very special case does the
problem of measuring physical output admit of a unique solution.
For as soon as the community's output is no longer homogeneous
1Cf.A. C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare (London, 1929), Part I, especially
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in respect of its physical characteristics, the measurement of -its
physical magnitude ceases to admit of the easy and simple solution
just indlicated, and becomes instead a more or less complicated
statistical problem. This lack of homogeneity assumes two forms.
First, the oranges may vary in quality. Second, the community
may produce not only oranges but apples as well. This distinction
between variations in quality and variations in kind, although often
of immense biological or physical significance, is by no means
fundamental from an economic standpoint. Technical differences
between one grade and another, which appear at first sight of
minor 'moment, may turn out to have great economic importance.
The consumer, ultimate or otherwise,1" is often exigent in quite
unexpected directions. For one grade an altogether different com-
modity may be a better substitute than another grade of the same
commodity. Nevertheless, the contrast between distinctions of
grade within a single commodity on the one hand, and the differ-
entiatiOn of separate and distinct commodities on the other, is a
convenient one, provided that we do not overrate its significance.
First, then, suppose still that oranges are the only kind of output,
but let us allow their, quality to vary. Two such sorts of variation
are relevant: (a) in respect of weight, juiciness, sugar content, and
other measurable characteristics; and (b) in respect of flavor,
color, texture, and other attributes that cannot be measured.
Now, as regards (a) —measurablecharacteristics —itis evi-
dent that each variable provides a separate and distinct measure
of physical output. Thus wecan use the number of oranges in the
crop, or their total weight, or their total juice or sugar content, or
indeed any other measurable characteristic. Since output is no
longer homogeneous with respect to these characteristics, it is only
be expected that each such computation will yield a different
result. Obviously no unique measure of output is any longer avail-
able unless we decide that some one variable —e.g.,number' or
weight ismore fundamental than any of the others. It is impor-
tant to realize that this is an essentially arbitrary decision. There is
no more reason why we should measure oranges by the thousand
than by the case or by the ton. For simplicity of exposition we have
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seen if we consider for a moment the problem of interpreting the
concept of a physical. unit of output in such a field as transporta-
tion. Is the ton, the carload, the ton-mile, the carload-mile, a
combination of these, or some altogether different measure to be
taken as the fundamental unit of service rendered (i.e., of output)
in the realm of freight transportation? For the moment this ques-
tion is merely posed. At a later stage in the argument an approach
to its solution will have to be attempted.
As regards (b) —nonmeasurablecharacteristics —thesitua-
tion is different. Suppose the oranges vary in flavor. Such varia-
tions in quality between different units of output, where these can-
not be quantitatively expressed, clearly cannot be made the basis
for still further alternative measures of physical output. It is im-
possible to take account of them directly. What such variations in
fact do, is to cast doubt upon the justification for choosing some
other, measurable variable as the fundamental unit for measuring
output. Suppose the oranges improve in flavor from year to year:
unless this fact happens accidentally to be correlated with weight,
or sugar content, or some other measurable characteristic, it will
in no wise be reflected in any of the measures discussed above.
We come now to the second possibility just mentioned. So far
the problems discussed already reach their full complexity in an
economy producing what is ordinarily thought of as a single com-
modity, i.e., oranges. Suppose now that the community grows
apples too. Having decided (with a greater or less degree of arbi-
trariness) what physical units to use for the measurement of
oranges and apples separately, we are faced with the problem of
combining them into a single measure representing the commu-
nity's total output.. It is obvious that this problem is different only
in degree, not in kind, from the problem of dealing with the output
of oranges, or other single commodity, when that output is not
homogeneous. Still for the moment confining ourselves to variables
of a purely physical nature, we might consider a single orange the
equivalent of a single apple; or we might add tons of oranges and
tons of apples; or we might perform the summation in terms of
juice, or sugar content, or any one of an infinite number of more
or less relevant and interesting physical characteristics, each timei68 APPENDIX A
reaching a different result.. Perhaps it might even be possible, with
sufficient ingenuity, to conceive of a context in which each of these
results would be appropriate.
The absurdity from the economic standpoint of any such pro-
cedure may be seen, not only in the essential arbitrariness of the
decisions to be taken, but also in the rapid and complete disap-
pearance of common physical characteristics among the commodi-
ties involved as we extend our purview. It remains possible, how-
ever inappropriate, to compare a ton of radium with. a ton of lead.
But a ton of lead, a unit of electricity, a ton-mile of transportation,
and a telephone call have on the other hand no physical character-
istics even superficially in common. Plainly an altogether different
line of attack must be sought.
VALUE AS A COMMON DENOMINATOR
Let us suppose that output consists of two commodities —.apples
and oranges —eachof which individually is homogeneous with
respect to all of its physical characteristics. The object of our search
is of course a ratio between apples and oranges (in terms of num-
ber, tons, cubic feet —orother physical unit) that has some mean-
ing economically and is not merely an arbitrary ratio, and that
will allow apples and oranges to be added in a manner which does
not have to look to some special context for its justification.
Now the fundamental unit in economic measurement is of
course the unit of money value. A dollar's worth of oranges and a
dollar's worth of apples are equivalent in the sense that they can
be exchanged for one. another in the market. For making com-
parisons between different .commoditiestherefore, the physical
unit we may label 'a dollar's worth' has a significance that a ton,
cubic foot, or carload lacks.
From the viewpoint of -ordinary common sense, it is of course
precisely the lack of correspondence between dollars' worth and
tons that is responsible for our instinctive unwillingness to com-
pare, for example, a ton of radium with a ton of lead. The arbi-
trariness, indeed the absurdity, of such a comparison disappears
once, the two commodities are reduced to common values —that
is, to physical units (i.e., dollars' worth).. of such a size that theTHE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 169
market in fact treats them as equivalent. The process of summing
amounts of different commodities in terms of dollars' worth is
statistically equivalent to summing any arbitrarily chosen physical
units, each weighted by its price.
While this solution is obviously of perfectly general application,
and may be used for combining.measures of physical output relat-
ing to any number of commodities, its requirements are not always
easy to satisfy. Thus in order that a unique index of output shall
emerge, the ratios between the market prices of given physical units
of the various commodities must remain invariable. This is of
course an impossible requirement. To put the matter otherwise,
what we have in fact done is to assimilate the construction of an
index of output to that of an index of prices. The record discloses
both price changes and quantity changes. It is the business of an
output index to abstract from the former, just as it is the business
of a price index to abstract from the latter. No such abstraction
can in the nature of things be performed unambiguously. It is not
our purpose here to trace once more the familiar outlines of the
'index number problem'.2 Choice of weight-base and formula will
influence the outcome. The particular compromises embodied in
the chronology and formulas used for computing purposes in the
present study are described elsewhere.
Further, we have assumed each commodity to be homogeneous
with respect to all of its physical characteristics. If, however, its
output varies in quality at any given moment of time, either meas-
urably or nonmeasurably, the difficulty can be overcome by grad-
ing, and treating each grade as a separate commodity. If this is
done, account will be taken in the computation both of measur-
able and of nonmeasurable variations from one unit to another of
the product, for both are equally reflected by the behavior of the
market in setting prices. Specially large and specially flavorsome
oranges both command a premium. So much —thereduction of
physically nonmeasurable variations, as well as those which are
measurable, to a common price basis —theuse of market valua-
tion does achieve, but only so far as these variations are contem-
2Cf.J. M. Keynes, Treatise on Money (LondOn, 1930), Ch. 8; Irving Fisher,
The Making of Index Numbers (Houghton Muffin, 1922).170 APPENDIX A
poraneous. Since abstraction is to be made from price changes
from one moment to another —thisbeing the whole object of an
output index —noaccount can be taken of physical variation
through time (whether measurable or not). If the quality of a
commodity improves through an increase in the fraction of its
output concentrated in the better grades, at the expense of inferior
grades, this will be accurately reflected in the computation. If on
the other hand the quality of a given grade —orof a single
homogeneous commodity —improveswith time, there is plainly
no way of recognizing the fact. We may be reasonably sure that,
especially in view of the comparatively coarse grading allowed
by the statistics, most quality changes in practice come about by
the latter method. We may be sure also that, on this account if
on no other, production indexes contain a rather serious down-
ward bias, in that they take too little account of changes in quality.
It might perhaps be thought that quality changes are no concern
of an index of output. That it is not possible to place the quality
of the products on one side, and to confine attention to measures
of quantity which are independent of quality, may easily be
demonstrated, and is indeed already implicit in what has been
said above. Consider a single commodity whose output, though
homogeneous at a'ny given moment, is subject to improvement in
quality through time. This improvement may be viewed as an
alteration in some or all of its physical attributes, or in the rela-
tions between them. The chemical becomes more nearly pure, the
automobile has more cylinders, the concrete lasts longer, the supply
of electricity is less frequently interrupted. No doubt we are pre-
vented, for the most part, from incorporating these developments
in our output index. And yet, who will deny that at any given
moment of time pure chemicals command a premium; so also do
many-cylindered automobiles, long-lasting concrete, and electrical
installations of unusual reliability. To the extent that we appeal
to market valuation as a basis for the summations our measure-
ments require, and weight products and grades according to their
prices, qualityas reflected in price-differentials —becomes
merely an aspect of quantity. The greater weight given to a
superior grade —asthe market rules it to be superior at anyTHE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 171
chosen moment —amountsto .a tacit admission that quality and
quantity arc, in large degree, intcrchangeablc concepts.
This fusion, of the concepts of quality and quantity results of
coursc directly from thc appeal to market valuation. rrhat in per-
forming the summations necessary to thc measurement of output
such an appeal .is inevitable, and the oniy available alternative to
a chaos of arbitrary decisions, has already been shown. But to
argue that the judgments. of the market are invariably a true cii-
tenon of economic significance, or that such judgments are always
unambiguous, would be a clear perversion of the facts. Since it is
impossible to construct a measure of output without a weighting
system, since the value concept is a convenient source of such a
system, and since this concept underlies all our computations, it
seems desirable to pursue the matter somewhat further.
THE LOGIC OF THE VALUE CONCEPT
The use of market values, or prices, as weights in computing the
output index was suggested above primarily as a means of avoid-
ing the need for arbitrary decisions. Since the market regards a
dollar's worth of apples and a dollar's worth of oranges as equiva-
lent or interchangeable, therefore —sothe argument ran we
may regard themas equal physical quantities. What this leads to
in practice is the aggregation of dollar volumes of different com-
modities at fixed. prices per ton, per yard, or other commercial
unit. By this procedure, the universal measure of physical output,
applicable to all commodities without exception, becomes the
dollar's worth —measuredat the base date or over the base period.
Now under very special circumstances— circumstances which
may roughly be labelled those of perfect competition —thispro-
cedure would have much more than merely pragmatic justifica-
tion. Let us assume an unreal world in which perfect equality
exists everywhere in the marginal significance attached to con-
sumer expenditure in different directions, and. at the same time
perfect equivalence between market price and marginal cost
of production; and further in which resources are remunerated
according to their marginal productivity so interpreted, complete
mobility existing among occupations. In such a world the phrase.172 APPENDIX A
'a dollar's worth' has a universal significance which is partially
denied to it as things actually stand in the world as we know it.
In such a world a dollar's worth, no matter of what commodity,
comprises on the one hand, from the viewpoint of any given con-
sumer, a standard amount of satisfaction. It measures at the same
time on the other hand the product of a standard amount of
resources. Furthermore, a dollar's worth of resources, no matter
of what kind, will everywhere produce the same output as a
dollar's worth of any other kind. The 'dollar's worth' therefore
constitutes at any moment, in this ideal world, an unambiguous
physical unit, not only of output, but of resources and satisfactions
as well. This is of course true only at any given moment, for in
making comparisons through time the ambiguities inherent in the
'index number problem' are in no way mitigated.
Consider then just whatinsuch a wOrldour appeal to the
judgment of the market would have achieved. It would have pro-
vided us with a measure of output enabling us (apart from the
index number problem, and apart also from possible deficiencies
of coverage) to settle certain questions unambiguously. A rise in
our index would be uniquely correlated with a rise in the com-
munity's aggregate level of satisfaction. If the community did not
consume more of one thing, we would know that the community
had chosen to consume more of something else. A rise in the index,
unaccompanied by a corresponding rise in the amount of resources
employed in production, would argue a real increase of economic
efficiency. The economy could now produce as much as it pro-
• duced previously, and still have resources over.
Evidently the significance of any output index we can actu-
ally construct will in large degree depend upon how closely the
behavior of actual markets conforms to the ideal outlined above.
Some consideration of actual market conditions is therefore called
for.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKET VALUATION
Of the markets in which commodity output is sold the great major-
ity are more or less imperfectlycompetitive. Perfect competition is
probably as rare as outright monopoly. To some extent no doubtTHE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 173
the values. of farm products, minerals, and manufactures differ
from the ideal values outlined above. Nevertheless, in the com-
modity field the difficulty is almost certainly less than in the pro-
duction sale of intangibles. Especially is this true of public
utilities. The prices at which transportation, gas, and electricity
are sold are notoriously the subject both of administrative control
and of monopolistic discrimination. How then do these facts affect
the construction and significance of our indexes of output?
Let us first consider the case of simple monopoly and see what
becomes of the argument of the foregoing section. An electric
utility, we will suppose, sells current at a price which, owing to
the absence both of competition and of effective rate control,
yields a particularly handsome return on its investment. The con-
sumer pays more than the minimum necessary to attract and main-
tain resources in the industry, and purchases less current than he
would do were the price per unit lower. To any given consumer,
however, the significance of the marginal dollar's worth of elec-
tricity is still the same as the significance of the marginal dollar
devoted to the purchase of any other commodity. From the view-
point of consumer satisfaction, therefore, the fact that a certain
(electric current) is monopolized in no way invali-
dates our use of market prices as weights in the construction of an
output index. Whatever the structure of the market, the prices the
consumer pays are alone relevant to the measurement of output,
when output is regarded merely as a source of consumer satis-
faction.
But output has to be related also to the resources employed in
its production. It is no longer true that a dollar's worth of elec-
tricity represents the product of the same amount of resources, in
any intelligible sense, as does a dollar's worth of other commodi-
ties not monopolized.8 The price at which a kilowatt-hour sells
represents its cost to the consumer indeed, but to no one else. The
cost of a unit of electricity to the community, in terms of the
resources used up in its production, is measured by the sum for
Unless of. course monopoly power is itself regarded as a resource, whose
servicesappropriately priced. But this does not seem a reasonable inter-
pretation.174 APPENDIX A
which that unit would sell if return on investment were normal and
monopoly profit were absent. If therefore the units in which, in
our index, we measure output are to represent (at the base date)
the consumption of a defined amount of resources, rather than the
provision to some given consumer of a defined amount of satisfac-
tion, we must work with cost, including a normal return to invest-
ment, rather than with selling price. Where monopoly profit
accrues, these two evidently diverge. It no longer is possible to
construct a single output index, perfectly correlated both with the
level of satisfaction to the community and with the consumption
of real resources of a given efficiency.
These two systems of weights —onebased on selling price, the
other on cost —ofcourse coincide in the world of ideal competitive
behavior considered at the outset of this discussion. In the case of
our electric utility it was not the fact of monopoly, but the exis-
tence of monopoly profit, that caused them to diverge. Had an efli-
cient public service commission been in control of rates, such diver-
gencemight not have occurred. In asking ourselves how far existing
market valuations really are appropriate for weighting an output
index, or how far they conceal ambiguities of the kind indicated,
the use made of monopoly power is more important than the fact
of its existence.
The ambiguity —insofaras it relates to conditions of simple
monopoly —isillustrated more concretely in the following exam-
ple. The community's output consists of two commodities, A and
B. A we will suppose moriopolized, while B is produced and sold
competitively. In two years A costs $1 to produce and sells for
$2 a ton, whereas B costs and sells for $1 a ton. Let the outputs be
as follows:.
Year I Year II
A, tons 100 140
B, tons 100 50
Using the two alternative systems of weights, we have the follow-
ing output indexes:
Year 1 Year II
Weighted by selling price:
Price-sum $300 $330
Index of output 100 110
Weighted by cost of production:
Price-sum $200 $190
Index of output 100THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 175
Evidently the question, Is the community better or worse off in
Year II than in Year I? receives no immediate answer.
In terms of dollars' worth of satisfaction, measured at the mar-
gin, output is larger, and the community appears to be better off.
But consumers' preferences have evidently so altered —theynow
take nearly three tons of A for every ton of B, instead of ton for
ton, at unchanged prices —thatany statement about the com-
parative satisfaction yielded by a dollar's expenditure in the two
years appears unwarranted. The best we can do is to remark that
if the marginal utility of the dollar has not declined, then the com-
munity is better off, in the sense that its level of satisfaction is
higher, in Year II than in Year I.
In terms of dollars' worth of resources, on the other hand, also
measured at the margin, output is smaller. Certainly it would seem
that, if resources are mobile, and if their efficiency has not declined,
the output of Year II can be obtained with fewer resources than
that of Year I. In the use made of its resources, the community
would seem to be worse off, or less efficient. How output would
have, behaved had there been no monopoly, had A been sold at its
cost of $1 a ton (as B is sold), we have of course no means of
knowing. However, under such conditions, no such ambiguity
would develop in the measurement of output as that present in
the instance cited.
The principle involved here is a perfectly general one. Evidently
an ambiguity of this kind will appear whenever the demand price
for a commodity differs from its cost of production. Cost has to
be interpreted to include all payments necessary in the circum-
stances to attract resources and maintain them in a given occupa-
tion. The case of simple monopoly was discussed above merely
because it provides a convenient illustration of the difficulty which
arises when prices and costs do not correspond —whenmarket
price, that is, ceases to measure the amount of resources employed
in production. Further important cases of the same difficulty
include commodities subject to taxation,4 or to price discrimina-
tion, and commodities jointly produced but inappropriately priced.
The first of these, taxation, is important for certain manufactures,
Taxation can of course be regarded as the price of services rendered to pro-
duction by the state, but even so it would be hard to argue that such services
arc appropriately priced in each individual case.i76 APPENDIX A
e.g., beverages and tobacco products, but do'es not much affect the
market for public utility services.
Price discrimination and joint supply are more in point for our
purpose and may conveniently be considered together, they
merge into each other. The production of electric current has at
one time or another been viewed as embodying both principles. It
is, for example, a commonplace that current for domestic use is
sold at higher prices than current for industrial purposes. So that
if we regard a kilowatt-hour of electricity as a uniform commodity,
irrespective of the character of the purchaser and the conditions
surrounding its sale, it is evidently the practice of electric utilities
to discriminate among their customers.
On the other hand the cost of supplying a kilowatt-hour differs
considerably according to the load factor associated with, or
embodied in the agreement for, its use, and with the quantity and
type of equipment involved in supplying individual consumers.
Moreover, the generation of current for some uses affects the cost
of its supply for other uses. If we argue in this fashion, it would
seem foolish to regard the total supply of kilowatt-hours as a single
homogeneous commodity. In fact the provision of current for dif-
ferent uses would appear to possess many of the elements com-
monly associated with joint supply.
However we may prefer to analyze the situation, we know that
apparently similar commodities, such as kilowatt-hours, are—like
ton-miles of transportation —soldto different customers at widely
different prices. What we wish to discover is whether, if we use
these prices as weights in computing our output index, an ambi-
guity of the kind discussed above will ensue. Clearly such an ambi-
guity will be introduced insofar as price differences fail to corre-
spond to differences of cost. This is the relevant criterion, and some
attempt must be made to judge how far in their price policies
public utilities and railroads do or do not conform to it.
The business of rate-making almost always leads in practice to
a compromise between what is commonly called the 'value-of-
service' principle (in other words, what the traffic will bear) on the
one hand, and the 'cost-of-service' principle (that is, the cost of
handling a particular shipment) on the other. To take the latterTHE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 177
principle first: that each consumer of electricity or shipper of goods
should bear at least the direct costs of the service he receives
requires no special justification. That consumers are assessed, so
far as general rules allow, with the cost of special equipment
needed to serve them, or of specific charges entailed in handling
their goods, is a well established principle of rate-making and
need not detain us. Unfortunately, the costs common to the whole,
or a large part, of the output of a utility or railroad are so consider-
able that the mere proviso that each consumer shall bear his own
direct costs carries us only a very short distance. It does no more
than set a floor below which individual rates must not be allowed
to fall. To complete the schedule of rates (still for the time being
adhering to the cost-of-service principle) it is necessary to distribute
these common costs among the various classes of traffic. Authority
exists for the statement that the proper interpretation of the cost-
of-service principle results in distributing these common costs at a
uniform rate per kilowatt-hour or per as the case may
be.5 To justify such a distribution we have to appeal to what would
happen under simple competition. But such an appeal has little
application in a field that is inevitably monopolized, and where
competition may yield zero output. It would appear preferable to.
conclude that, if the cost-of-service principle alone were in ques-
tion, the solution to the problem of railroad rate-making would be
indeterminate.
According to the value-of-service principle, on the other hand,
each consumer is charged whatever maximizes the net revenue of
the enterprise. The prescription of the value-of-service principle
therefore results in discriminating monopoly. Insofar as railroads
and utilities follow this prescription —andthere can be no doubt
that they do so to a large extent —itmight be thought the prin-
ciple that prices arid costs should correspond is reduced thereby to
a mere pretence. That, even under a regime of discriminating
monopoly, prices and costs are not necessarily unequal is best seen
by reverting to the analysis of joint supply. Where several products
come from a single process in unvarying proportions, the relation-
ship between their selling prices in a competitive market will be
Cf. A. C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare, Part II, Cli. XVIII.178 APPENDIXA
such that the whole supply of each is absorbed without leaving
unsatisfied customers. Provided that returns to the enterprise are
normal, the aggregate proceeds will correspond to the aggregate
costs of operation. While these costs cannot be imputed to particu-
lar products without reference to their selling prices, the price at
which each product sells will of course measure its cost to the con-
sumer, and in a real (if special) sense also its cost to the community
at large, i.e., the amount of resources consumed in its production.
Obviously true of all the products taken together, this statement is
true also of each individual product, in the sense that only when
these prices are charged is the market in equilibrium. In true cases
of joint supply, therefore, the condition that price differences shall
be such as to clear the market of each product, coupled with the
further condition that the general level of these product prices
shall secure normal returns to the enterprise —thesetwo condi-
tions taken together allow a complete determination of the costs
of each and every product.
Unfortunately in the case of utilities and railroads so simple a
solution does not exist. The provision of electric current or of
transportation is not a true case of joint supply, because given
quantities of service to one type of consumer do not imply stated
quantities of service to another type. There is no such thing, for
example, as clearing the market of any one kind of transport. In
other words very considerable variations are technically possible
in the relative degree to which a utility or railroad serves different
classes of consumer. Nevertheless this problem equally is capable
of a determinate solution, if we substitute for our previous condi-
tion, i.e., clearing the market, a new one, i.e., that the enterprise
shall work as close to full capacity as is compatible with a normal
return on its activities as a whole. This prescription may be de-
scribed as a modification of the value-of-service principle, for the
traffic is charged what it will bear in respect of the relation between
rates, though not as regards their general level.6
Neglecting prime costs, the condition is that the marginal revenues from each
class of consumer shall be equal. If the monopoly dispenses service in two mar-
kets only, at prices YiandY2respectively,this is equivalent to the condition
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In what sense can we say that such a plan keeps prices and
costs equal to one another? Since returns are normal, there can be
no doubt that the aggregate price paid for the services of the enter-
prise equals their aggregate cost. But there is no intelligible sense
in which individual rates in the separate markets can be charac-
terized as those which would prevail under competition. The most
we can say is that the ratc.structure envisaged gives the community
the maximum output it can obtain without a subsidy.7 Any other
set of rates would yield a smaller output and less efficient opera-
tion. Consumers in each market are charged, in the light of the
elasticity of demand in that market, the minimum price necessary
to cover normal returns. In this highly specialized sense, and in
this sense only, can we say that prices and costs are equal, and that
a weighting scheme which uses such prices is consequently appro-
priate.
In constructing our indexes of output for industries that practice
monopoly pricing, we have presented more than one series. For
railroads we have both weighted and unweighted ton-mile indexes,
for electrical utilities both weighted and unweighted kilowatt-hour
series. In some cases it does not much matter whether a weighting
scheme is adopted or not; in others it makes a good deal of differ-
ence. Where monopolistic discrimination is practiced, it remains
to ask, in terms of the preceding discussion, what degree of signifi-
cance is to be attached to a weighted index of output, the weights
being of course the actual prices charged by the monopoly in
different markets.
Whether or not the rate structure conforms to the conditions
prescribed above, conditions prescribed by social accounting, since
where e1ande,arethe respective elasticities of demand. For a real solution
there must be at least one set of prices that yields sufficient revenue for a
normal return. Ifdemands are elastic for high prices and inelastic for low
prices, there may be two solutions, one with high output, the other with low
output, intermediate outputs yielding more revenue than is needed. Where
there are two or more solutions, that with the highest utilization of capacity is
the one indicated.
TWithproposals to subsidize diminishing cost industries I have much sym-
pathy, but such proposals arc not here in question. We are seeking a weighting
system which will measure output, not the pricing policy which will maximize
'welfare'.i8o APPENDIX A.
the prices are actually paid, they do of course reflect defined
amounts of utility at the margin for any given consumer. The
domestic consumer who uses electric current for lighting and heat-
ing at different rates must be assumed to adjust his consumption
to the rates in question. To this extent therefore the prices are
appropriate weights for the measurement of output, independently
of any cost considerations, just as they would be in the case of a
simple monopolist who did not discriminate.
But the prices charged in different markets have a further appro-
priateness, in terms of social cost, only if the conditions outlined
above are fulfilled. Otherwise the ambiguity which arose under
simple monopoly is present here, in even higher degree, and the
problem of measuring output is not susceptible, even in theory, of
a determinate solution.
This discussion, prompted by the character of the markets in
which railroad and utility services are sold, has carried us to a
rather high level of abstraction. We have in fact little means of
telling just how far prices actually charged are appropriate in the
above sense. No unregulated monopoly could be expected to prac-
tice discrimination along the lines indicated. On the other hand it
may quite well be that the Interstate Commerce Commission, in
regulating the railroads, and public service commissions in regu-
lating electric utilities, have some such guiding principle as that
developed above. It is certainly arguable that considerations of
public policy lead to the conclusion that they should be guided by
such principles. Common sense also suggests that discriminatory
pricing by a commission-regulated monopoly will conform more
closely to our criterion than that by an unregulated monopoly.
Without an elaborate investigation of the policies of the various
commissions, it seems impossible to be more definite than this. We
can outline the conditions under which weighted indexes will be
preferable to unweighted indexes, even if we cannot be certain
that these conditions are fulfilled.
THE COMBINATION OF INDUSTRIES.
The preceding sections were concerned mainly with combining
the outputs of different products into a single measure for theTHE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES i8.i
output of an entire industry. Broadly speaking we have been talk-
ing about gross output. The transition to net output (where this is
statistically feasible) requires the insertion of input data, on the
same principles, with of course negative weights. The combination
of the outputs (gross or net) of different industries can then pro-
ceed, provided again we have a basis for weighting. Where gross
outputs for various industries are summed (and this does not lead
to duplication, or such duplication is to be neglected) the entire
value of the industry's products affords an appropriate measure of
the importance of the industry. Where net outputs are to be com-
bined, the value added by the industry is the weight indicated.
In discussing industries in which monopoly (regulated or un-
regulated) is the rule, much the same problems have to be faced as
those encountered in weighting individual products. Thus, where
a monopoly earns more than the normal return, the usual ambi-
guity appears. Its value of products, or value added, continues to
correspond (in the usual vague way) to the marginal level of con-
sumer satisfaction, but ceases to bear any relation to the amount of
resources consumed. The same is true where an industry earns
subnormal returns, or is subsidized. In the first case, thinking in
terms of units of resources of a given efficiency, the value of prod-
ucts, or value added, exaggerates the relative importance of the
industry; in the second case, its relative importance is understated.
What of the actual state of affairs in the transportation in-
dustries? The appropriateness for weighting purposes of value of
products or value added clearly depends upon the extent to which
regulatory agencies do in fact secure (neither more nor less than)
normal returns to these industries. In the case of railroads it is
certainly arguable that the industry has failed even to earn normal
returns since the advent of motor transport. In that case we are
in danger of underweighting its importance in the economy as a
whole.
Other transportation agencies have perhaps been subsidized.
It has been claimed that inland waterways and truck and buslines
have received subsidies through the provision of rights of way at
public expense. The merchant marine and the airlines have been
aided financially in more explicit fashion. In these industries if182 APPENDIXA
returns, including subsidies, are normal, they are evidently sub-
normal when such aid is excluded. If the value of service as sold
to the purchaser is used for weighting purposes (as, broadly, has
beendone here) such treatment may possibly be appropriate in
terms of consumer satisfaction. But it evidently understates the
resources employed.